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The binding of tariff rates and adoption of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade 
Organization-sanctioned safeguards and antidumping 
mechanisms provided the basis to remove a multitude 
of instruments of protection in the Latin American 
countries discussed in this paper. At the same time, 
they helped in maintaining centralized control over 
the management of pressures for protection in agencies 
with economy-wide accountabilities. The World Trade 
Organization’s procedural requirements (for example, to 
follow published criteria, or participation by interested 
parties) helped leaders to change the culture of decision-
making from one based on relationships to one based 
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on objective criteria. However, when Latin American 
governments attempted to introduce economic sense 
—such as base price comparisons on an economically 
sensible measure of long-run international price rather 
than the more generous constructed cost concept that 
is the core of WTO rules—protection-seekers used the 
rules against them. They pointed out that World Trade 
Organization rules do not require the use of such criteria, 
nor do procedures in leading users (industrial countries) 
include such criteria. In sum, the administrative content 
of the rules supported liberalization; the economic 
content did not. 
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Safeguards and Antidumping in Latin American Trade 
Liberalization  
 
J. Michael Finger and Julio J. Nogués 
 
 
This paper reports on success – success in the removal of trade barriers so as to integrate 
Latin American economies into the international economy. More particularly, this paper is about 
how several Latin American governments created and managed safeguards and antidumping 
mechanisms as part of this liberalization. 
The paper summarizes the results of a project of studies that looked into how each of 
seven Latin American countries—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and 
Peru—have used these trade instruments. Each country study was conducted by analysts from 
that country. Many of the analysts were high government officials during their country’s 
liberalization, so they have hands-on experience with the construction and the management of 
these instruments. 
The study reversed the usually approach to examining application of safeguards and 
antidumping.  Rather than judge Latin American performance against WTO rules – examining if 
Latin American officials followed the technicalities of measuring dumping, injury, and so forth – 
we examined the rules against Latin American performance.  We accept that Latin American 
leaders who led and took responsibility for liberalization were committed to it, then evaluate how 
adoption of GATT/WTO sanctioned antidumping and safeguard mechanisms helped or hindered 
their achievement of their objectives.  We asked the authors of the country studies to examine 
how each country’s creation and use of these mechanisms as tools of policy management, for 
example,    3
•  What role policy managers saw for these instruments as part of a liberalization program 
•  How the use of these instruments has contributed to maintaining a dynamic toward openness 
to international trade  
•  Where these instruments have caused problems  
•  How policy managers have dealt with the problems. 
  Because safeguards and antidumping are instruments that, by their nature, impose import 
restrictions, identifying where policy managers have found discipline over application (for 
instance, within the economic content of the rules or through the deterrent effect of the 
information requirements imposed on petitioners and on the government), was of particular 
interest in the analyses. 
In this summary, we provide first our reflections on each country study.  (The studies 
themselves are also available as Working Papers.)  Next, we review the overall use of trade 
defense measures and then go on to review several other cross-cutting issues. We compare the 
policy-making institutions of the seven countries, focusing on how World Trade Organization 
(WTO) rules for those mechanisms contributed to the liberalization effort and how those rules 
might be made even more supportive of the liberalization effort. 
I. REFLECTIONS ON THE COUNTRY STUDIES 
Even though many elements that we highlight in these reflections are present in more than one 
country’s experiences, we chose the material in the reflections so that what we draw from one 
study overlaps minimally with what we draw from another, thus bringing out the comparative 
advantage lesson from each study. There is much more material in each country study than we 
have included in our reflections; the reflections should serve as an invitation to read the studies, 
not as a substitute for reading them.  
Political Economy of Antidumping and Safeguards in Argentina, by Julio J. 
Nogués and Elías Baracat  (WPS3587) 
In 1989, Argentina began a series of economic reforms that were revolutionary in speed, scope, 
and depth. Major sectors of the economy that were previously dominated by public enterprises 
were privatized, and foreign investment was put on an equal footing with domestic investment. 
All import licensing requirements were removed.  Tariff rates that had averaged 40 percent in the   4
mid-1980s fell to an average of 14 percent by the mid-1990s. On imports from within Mercosur 
(Mercado Común del Sur, or Southern Cone Common Market), most tariffs fell to zero by the 
mid-1990s.  The adoption of GATT/WTO-sanctioned trade remedies – antidumping and 
safeguard mechanisms –  was a small but significant part of the reform package.  
In drafting the regulations and in creating the institutional mechanisms that would 
administer them, Argentina made a serious attempt to incorporate good economics into their 
structures and to establish discipline over their use. A presumption built into the mechanisms 
was that adhering to WTO requirements would strengthen the government’s position in resisting 
domestic pressures for protection. 
That presumption turned out to be false.  
Imports increased sharply after the initial trade reforms, an increase resulting as much 
from setting the exchange rate at a level that proved in time to be unsustainable as from the 
removal of import restrictions. The business community subsequently applied pressures to use 
the instruments of protection that remained, particularly antidumping. 
Antidumping  
The government’s strategy was to delay decisions on antidumping initiations while the 
new regulatory and institutional frameworks were being completed. In a well-publicized speech 
to the business community in April 1992, Minister of Economy Domingo Cavallo was emphatic 
in announcing that the government would refrain from using antidumping measures until the 
price level had stabilized. The main policy objective at the time was to tame inflation, and the 
government considered import competition an important source of price discipline. Although the 
government received 135 petitions between 1988 and 1994, it opened only 69 investigations. 
Complaints about the administration of the antidumping mechanism convinced the 
government that it should update that mechanism. The first step was to modify Argentine law in 
accordance with the Tokyo Round antidumping code. During the preparation of operational 
regulations for the antidumping mechanism, the Unión Industrial Argentina submitted a draft 
that more or less followed U.S. practice. The government, however, adopted a more liberal code 
that included several provisions that could serve as the basis for limiting use. (Such provisions 
were allowed, but not required, by the GATT code.) Among these provisions were:   5
•  A lesser duty rule that allows the government to limit antidumping duties to the level 
necessary to prevent injury when that level is below the observed margin of dumping 
•  A method of imposing antidumping duties that makes it easy for exporters to know what 
price they must charge to avoid those duties 
•  A national interest clause that allows the government to deny antidumping measures, even 
when dumping and injury determinations are positive. 
The second step in reforming the antidumping mechanism was to create a technically 
oriented commission to administer injury investigations—the Comisión Nacional de Comercio 
Exterior (CNCE). A major piece of evidence influencing the government’s assessment of the 
need for a technically-oriented commission was the finding from analysis of existing 
antidumping systems that the injury test provided more of an opportunity to apply discipline than 
did the determination of dumping. The legal definition of dumping differs so much from its 
intuitive or economic definition (pricing for export below home market price) that dumping in 
the legal sense has been found in virtually every investigation in every country that had 
antidumping regulations in place. 
The CNCE, created in 1994, functions under the Ministry of Economy. To ensure their 
competence and their independence from the Commissioners, recruitment of the technical staff 
was delegated to a private consulting company. Members of the technical staff prepare an injury 
report, and then the commissioners decide if the evidence supports a positive injury 
determination. The CNCE’s decisions are made by a majority vote of its president and the four 
commissioners.  Following an affirmative determination, the CNCE assesses the need for and 
recommends to the Minister of Economy the introduction of appropriate measures. 
Contrary to what the government hoped to achieve, macroeconomic circumstances in 
Argentina overcame the capacity of WTO-sanctioned trade remedies and of the technical 
analysis supplied by the CNCE to discipline the application of trade restrictions. The trade 
liberalization policies and the overvaluation of the exchange rate led to a strong increase of 
imports, from less than US$5 billion in the late 1980s to more than US$30 billion in the late 
1990s. With this increase in imports came large-scale displacement of domestic production. For 
the first time in several decades, the unemployment rate reached 10 percent in 1993, increasing 
to 20 percent by 1995.   6
After adopting the new antidumping regulations and creating the CNCE, Argentina 
became one of the world’s most intense users of antidumping measures. From 1995 to 1999, 
Argentina applied 65 antidumping measures, exceeded only by the European Union (105), the 
United States (104), and South Africa (75). 
Although the old antidumping rules had provided little discipline over when restrictions 
could be imposed, they had likewise provided minimal restraint on the government’s discretion 
not to take action. Under the new rules with their deadlines and standards for content of a 
petition, the government could not indefinitely postpone the initiation of investigations. 
Moreover, in the distressed economic situation that existed in Argentina, many industries could 
meet the standards for relief. Sound technical analysis of the facts found that many industries 
were being injured by import competition and that, under the rules, were deserving of protection. 
The new mechanism thus provided minimal political leverage for the government to resist 
protectionist pressure. Particularly in 1999–2001, when the economy was in recession and the 
peso was severely overvalued, the government was unable to set aside the technical 
determinations. A high percentage of investigations ended with decisions to impose restrictions. 
Safeguards  
In establishing a safeguard mechanism, the government attempted to follow the spirit as 
well as the letter of the WTO Safeguards Agreement. An industry that petitions for protection 
must present a plan for investment and structural reforms to demonstrate how it will overcome 
its competitive disadvantage. Moreover, the CNCE is authorized to take into account the 
requested actions’ potential cost to import users. 
The CNCE turned down eight of the first nine safeguard petitions it received; through 
2002 returned only 3 affirmative determinations.  Consumer cost and the petitioner’s not 
providing a convincing plan for recovery were often the basis for not initiating an investigation 
or for a negative determination.  From the perspective of a protection seeker, the safeguard 
instrument became a less-attractive alternative than the antidumping mechanism. 
The positive side of the story is that the hard-won trade liberalization, in large part, was 
maintained. Since devaluation, Argentina initiated 14 antidumping investigations in 2002, 1 in 
2003, and 7 in the first half of 2004.   7
Lessons 
Discipline has come, in part, from the widespread realization that isolation is not an 
effective economic policy. As to Argentina’s accepting the discipline of international rules, the 
economic content of the rules has not been a source of discipline. In a situation of 
macroeconomic balance, injury analysis separates the few from the many. In a situation of 
macroeconomic imbalance, the many are judged deserving of protection. 
The most important lesson we draw from this study is that, in spite of Argentina’s 
macroeconomic imbalance and its currency crisis, WTO rules did prevent the proliferation of 
protection instruments that has characterized previous crises in Argentina—a proliferation that, 
in the past, had made discipline impossible to maintain. 
Antidumping and Safeguard Mechanisms: The Brazilian Experience, 1988–
2003, by Honorio Kume and Guida Piani (WPS3562) 
By the late 1980s, the import-substitution industrialization process and recurrent 
exchange rate crises had led to the accumulation of many severe import controls in Brazil: such 
as lists of forbidden items, enterprise-specific limits on foreign purchases, shipment-by-shipment 
authorizations for imports of steel, and information technology products. Tariff rates were high, 
many surcharges were applied, benchmark customs values could be applied if officials sensed 
there were irregularities in import prices.  Exemptions from duties were available in some 
circumstances. Application of these restrictions and exceptions was done through processes that 
allowed wide discretion to government officials, with decisions often made at the sectoral level. 
Reforms  
Although other Latin American countries have opened their economies rapidly, usually 
under the leadership of one administration, Brazil has conducted reform under several 
presidencies. In 1988 and 1989, the Sarney government was able to achieve some tariff 
reduction, and in March 1990, shortly after coming to office, the Collor de Melo administration 
introduced a degree of flexibility to exchange-rate management, suspended the program for 
enterprise-specific limits on foreign purchases, and eliminated a number of special import 
regimes. The government also announced a tariff reform that by mid-1993 brought down the 
average rate on industrial products to 20 percent.   8
As in other Latin American countries, control of inflation was a major factor behind the 
decision to reduce import barriers. The Plan Real, initiated in July 1994 by the Franco 
administration and continued during most of the two terms of the Cardoso administration, had 
inflation as its most prominent target. (From 1964 to 1994, prices in Brazil had risen by 1 
quadrillion percent, with 1 quadrillion being 10
15, or 1 million multiplied by 1 billion.) Fiscal and 
monetary reforms were the plan’s most prominent elements, but the concern to discipline prices 
brought additional support for trade liberalization. Under the Plan Real, the Brazilian tariff 
average (unweighted) that was more than 50 percent ad valorem in 1987 declined to 11 percent 
by 1994. 
By the end of 1994, the inflow of foreign capital attracted by the plan’s privatization 
program brought substantial appreciation of the real exchange rate. This inflow of foreign 
capital, along with the accumulation of import liberalizations, brought a more than threefold 
increase of imports, and with this increase came intense pressure for protection from several 
sectors. Mercosur arrangements limited possible increases of tariff rates; even so, the average 
tariff rose by 1999 to almost 15 percent. The government applied safeguard actions on toys and 
textiles and, in some sectors, used administrative measures such as import deposit requirements 
or strict application of phytosanitary requirements to respond to protectionist pressures.  
In 1999, the Brazilian currency, the Real, was allowed to float freely; it quickly declined 
by more than 40 percent. Since then, tariff reduction has been renewed, and by the end of 2003, 
the average tariff was less than 11 percent. 
Administering Institutions 
Policy formation in Brazil often requires an extended process of working toward 
consensus among a number of government agencies and the sectoral interests each represents. 
Administration of the antidumping, safeguards, and countervailing duties instruments reflects 
this approach to governance. Currently, investigations are conducted by the Department of 
Commercial Defense (DECOM) within the Ministry of Development, Industry, and Foreign 
Trade. 
When DECOM’s technical findings (dumping, injury, a causal link) are affirmative, the 
Brazilian Chamber of Foreign Trade (CAMEX) reaches a decision on trade defense measures by 
majority vote. CAMEX is an overview agency governed by a Council of Ministers. This council   9
is composed of the ministers of Finance; Development, Industry and Foreign Trade; Foreign 
Affairs; Agriculture; and Planning and Budget, as well as the Civil Cabinet minister. The 
minister of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade presides.  
Within CAMEX, protectionist and openness interests are balanced by the inclusion both 
of ministries with sectoral interests and those with economy wide interests. Those with sectoral 
interests are more inclined to view trade restrictions as support for jobs and production in Brazil. 
The Ministry of Finance’s economy wide responsibilities and its continuing concern about trade 
openness as a means to control inflation make it a major force in favor of disciplined use. 
Brazil’s leadership position in international negotiations also comes into play. Brazil has a strong 
record in opposition to the unjustified use of antidumping and to its inclusion in regional 
arrangements. 
The content of Brazil’s antidumping (and other trade defense) regulations also reflects the 
Brazilian mode of conducting government affairs. In 1995, when Brazil modified its trade 
defense regulations to comply with the Uruguay Round agreements, it added several provisions 
that were allowed, but not mandated, by the agreements, for example, 
•  A national interest provision that would permit CAMEX not to impose a restriction when 
the trade defense investigation reached an affirmative determination 
•  A lesser duty rule that would allow an antidumping duty to be less than the dumping 
margin. 
Experience 
Antidumping is by far the most often used commercial defense measure. From 1995 
through June 2004, Brazil notified the WTO of 114 initiations and 59 measures. (Half of Brazil’s 
antidumping cases ended without restrictive action, compared with less than 40 percent across all 
WTO members.) Steel, chemicals, and plastics are the most frequently affected sectors. During 
the same time period, Brazil has taken safeguard action in only two cases, against toys and 
against coconuts, and has not initiated a countervailing duty investigation since 1995. As in other 
Latin American countries that have created trade defense mechanisms as part of a trade 
liberalization program, Brazil has administered antidumping measures with attention to 
separating the effect of exposure to normal international competition from the effect of exposure 
to abnormal business practices. In half of Brazilian investigations, normal value—the value   10
against which export price is compared to determine whether there is dumping—was estimated 
on the basis of international prices quoted in specialized publications or specialized information 
services. 
Another outcome that the country study reports is a relatively high use of the lesser duty 
rule—the application of an antidumping measure that is smaller than the observed dumping 
margin. Overall, Brazilian antidumping duties have averaged about 60 percent of estimated 
dumping margins. The balancing of interests in CAMEX is largely a matter of the degree of 
protection provided. Of the 86 cases that the authors studied that did not lead to protective 
measures, only 2 cases came to that result because of a determination of other, overriding 
interests. 
There is, however, a worrying finding. The Brazil study looks into one question on which 
the other studies did not concentrate: Have antidumping measures supported the monopoly 
power of domestic enterprises? The authors found that 41 percent of antidumping restrictions 
applied to a product for which there was only one domestic producer and 80 percent protected 
industries in which there were five or fewer Brazilian producers. 
Lessons 
Since it was first established in the late 1980s, the Ministry of Development, Industry, 
and Foreign Trade has become more powerful in the administration of the antidumping 
mechanism while the Ministry of Finance has become less influential. The consensual nature of 
Brazil’s decision-making process, however, mitigates against that change marking a significant 
shift toward the imposition of import restrictions. The Brazilian process demands consideration 
of many petitions, but it conditions petitioners to accept a relatively high rate of rejection. It also 
conditions the acceptance of a modified outcome, hence the high rate of application of duties that 
are lower than dumping margins. 
Keeping Animal Spirits Asleep: The Case of Chile, by Sebastián Sáez (WPS3587) 
For a short period in the early days of its economic reform and liberalization program, 
Chile applied a number of contingent protection measures. Since 1995, however, Chile has 
imposed only six antidumping measures, six countervailing measures, and seven safeguard 
measures, none more than 12 months in length. As of December 2003, none remained in effect.   11
Among WTO members who use contingent protection instruments, Chile has perhaps the 
most tightly disciplined management of these instruments. That discipline stems from a 
prevailing politics that sees open trade policy as part of a reduction of government control over 
the economy—a transformation that enjoys wide support—and as an institutional structure that 
transforms this philosophy into a workable administrative system. 
Chile’s Economic Reforms 
Chile’s trade opening was part of a broader macroeconomic stabilization process, and 
economic reforms, in turn, were part of a large-scale institutional transformation that 
encompassed the country’s political regime and general economic framework as well as the role 
of the state in the economy and in social policy. 
Chile’s reforms began in 1973, more than a decade earlier than those in other Latin 
American countries. By 1978, a tariff made up of widely varying rates that averaged more than 
90 percent ad valorem had been replaced by a uniform 10 percent rate (with few exceptions). 
Other trade restrictions such as quotas, import prohibitions, and advance deposit requirements 
were eliminated.  
Even with tariff rates reduced to 10 percent, the government had a skeptical attitude 
toward contingent protection and other mechanisms that would even temporarily suspend 
adjustment to the new trade regime. 
Initial Experience 
By the early 1980s, however, the Chilean real exchange rate had notably appreciated, and 
many industries pressed for relief from import competition. The government viewed 
antidumping measures as having little economic rationale and the antidumping mechanism as 
being too easily captured by protectionist interests. 
Safeguards, likewise, were seen as having questionable economic justification. Moreover, 
GATT rules required that any country that imposed a safeguard action must provide 
compensation—in the form of equivalent reduction of restrictions on other products—to 
principle-supplier exporting countries. If not, exporting countries would have the right to 
retaliate against, in this case, Chilean exports.   12
The government did, however, consider the correction of distortions a valid reason for 
intervention in the economy. (A distortion exists when the price of a product does not equal its 
private cost of production in a competitive environment.) A foreign subsidy might therefore be a 
valid reason for trade protection. 
In 1981, Chile created a Subsidies Commission within its central bank (BCCH) and soon 
became an active user of antisubsidy measures. On the basis of a finding of the commission, the 
Minister of the Economy could impose tariff surcharges up to the 35 percent rate that was 
Chile’s ceiling binding under the GATT. The commission could also recommend, and the 
minister could apply, minimum custom values for assessing duties. 
Chile had signed the Tokyo Round subsidies code, but its commitment to a GATT ceiling 
binding of 35 percent allowed the latitude for tariff rate adjustments within that ceiling without 
the need for a code-complying finding of subsidy and injury. Chile took approximately 60 
actions in the early 1980s. Most of these were against four countries—Argentina, Brazil, Peru, 
and Spain—and they led to considerable friction. 
During the early 1980s, trade and current account deficits increased considerably, and the 
fixed exchange rate regime became unsustainable. In March 1983 Chile shifted to across-the-
board measures to manage its trade situation, temporarily doubling its tariff rate and, most 
important, allowing the peso to float.  
Administration of these trade policy mechanisms at the time was a compromise among 
the technicalities of the GATT subsidy code, the resources available to conduct investigations, 
and the economic objectives of the government. The resource demands for establishing a subsidy 
in accord with the demands of the GATT code meant that formal countervailing measures were 
taken infrequently. The GATT required that tariff surcharges be applied to all imports from all 
sources, independent of whether their prices were distorted. Hence, when the source of 
distortion-bearing imports provided a small share of Chile’s imports, the remedy applied was 
usually a minimum customs value. 
Current Instruments and Administration 
In 1989, the National Commission on Distortions (CND) succeeded the National 
Commission for Price Distortions through Imports, which had succeeded the original Subsidies   13
Commission. The CND is responsible for investigations related to all aspects of safeguard, 
antidumping, and countervailing measures. The commission’s members include 
•  One from the National Economic Prosecutor’s Office, who chairs 
•  Two from the BCCH 
•  One each from the Ministries of Finance, Agriculture, Foreign Relations, and Economy 
•  One from the National  Directorate of Customs.  
The CND is served by a Technical Secretariat, which is lodged in and under the budget of 
the central bank. If the commission determines that the statutory requirements for action are met, 
it must adopt a resolution recommending the appropriate tariff surcharges. The resolution, along 
with the background information and conclusions of the investigation, are transmitted to the 
president of Chile, who makes a final decision through a decree of the Ministry of Finance. The 
discipline in the system comes from its structure, the statutory limits under which it operates, 
and, most important,  strong public support in favor of an open economy. 
Structural Sources of Discipline 
There are several structural sources of discipline over the use of trade defense measures, 
including the following: 
•  General interest agencies of government dominate the contingent protection process. The 
final decision is by the president. The only sectoral interest ministry with a seat on the CND 
is the Ministry of Agriculture. Agriculture is one of Chile’s most trade-sensitive industries, 
and exceptional protection instruments have been designed for agricultural products. 
•  The CND is chaired by a representative of the National Economic Prosecutor’s Office. That 
office is independent from any other governmental organization or service, particularly from 
the authorities and courts before which it fulfills its functions. It is responsible not only to see 
that competition law is enforced but also to actively promote competition in the Chilean 
economy. 
•  The Technical Secretariat of the CND is lodged in and under the budget of the BCCH, an 
institution that has little attachment to sectoral interests. 
•  A floating exchange rate regime has consistently avoided overvaluation of the peso since the 
early 1980s.   14
•  A low uniform tariff (with few exceptions) implies that contingent protection measures create 
strong reactions from final producers and consumers.  
Statutory Discipline 
•  There is statutory discipline over the use of trade defense measures as follows: Chilean law 
allows only tariff surcharges. Neither import quotas nor price undertakings can be used. 
•  The president cannot impose an action more restrictive than that recommended by the CND. 
•  The maximum length for which a measure may be imposed is one year. Extension requires 
an entirely new investigation, resolution, and decision.  
•  CND decisions are by majority of the votes cast. However, if the recommended surcharge 
will increase the tariff above the bound rate, then the approval of three-quarters of the 
members of the commission is required. 
•  An antidumping or countervailing duty must not exceed the margin of distortion calculated 
by comparing the prices of dumped with nondumped (or subsidized with unsubsidized) 
imports. The objective is to remove the distortion to competition rather than to prevent 
displacement of domestic production. 
•  Consumers are recognized as interested parties. Regulations allow full participation during 
the course of an investigation by any person who may feel affected. 
Widespread Support 
The structure of the contingent protection system described here is not one that carried 
over from the military regime. The laws that govern the use of contingent protection all date 
from the 1990s after the country returned to democratic government. The law that introduced 
safeguards is from 1999 when the Chilean Congress demanded it in exchange for supporting the 
reduction of the uniform tariff to 6 percent. 
Lesson 
The trade regime has become a basic part of the new institutional structure of Chile’s 
economy, and its stability and consistency toward openness have supported and been supported 
by the transition to democratic government. This support is the strongest source of discipline. 
The key lesson we draw from Chile’s example is that, even in international trade, good 
economics, if skillfully managed, can be good politics.   15
Application of Safeguards and Antidumping Duties in Colombia, by Mauricio 
Reina and Sandra Zuluaga (WPS3615) 
During the second half of the last century, Colombia applied an industrialization strategy 
based on import substitution, as did most Latin American countries. While this strategy 
promoted some diversification of production, it also fostered concentrated property structures, 
high prices, low product quality, and few incentives for modernization. The high cost of imports 
made production based on foreign raw materials unsustainable. 
Faced with this situation, the government implemented a trade liberalization policy that 
began at the end of the 1980s and was consolidated during the early 1990s. An import licensing 
arrangement that based import quotas largely on the volume of domestic production was 
abandoned, and the percentage of tariff positions subject to quantitative restrictions fell from 73 
percent to 1 percent. The economy’s nominal average tariff fell from near 100 percent to 11 percent, 
but escalation maintained high rates of effective protection for some processing activities. Colombia 
deepened its integration in the Andean Community, where most tariff rates have been reduced to 
zero, and concluded trade agreements with several countries, including Chile, Mexico, and the 
República Bolivariana de Venezuela. These trade reforms were accompanied by strong currency 
devaluations, and at the present time, the real rate of exchange is deemed to be close to its 
equilibrium level. 
In the agricultural sector, the Andean Community countries maintain a system of variable 
levies that protect approximately 150 tariff positions for which the implicit average tariff is in the 
order of 60 percent. Reina and Zuluaga, authors of the study, report that a good share of 
Colombia’s agricultural sector has managed to remain outside the liberalization trends that began 
in 1990. 
Part of the politics of liberalization was the establishment of legal antidumping and 
safeguard instruments to deal with the foreign competition previously neutralized by the high 
overall level of protection.  Table 1 lists instruments and reports their frequencies of use. 
(Colombia has undertaken no countervailing duty investigations.) 
The normal safeguard mechanism follows the WTO Safeguards Agreement and is usually 
referred to as a WTO safeguard. A petitioner for a WTO safeguard action is subject to extensive 
WTO-based requirements to provide the information necessary to demonstrate injury or threat of 
injury. This information must be certified by a public accountant. In addition, the applicant must   16
submit an adjustment program that lists the steps it will take to modernize and adapt to the new 
competitive conditions. Antidumping regulations were revised in 1995 to incorporate the 
discipline of the Uruguay Round agreements. 
Larger enterprises in Colombia have adopted use of the trade defense instruments, much 
as similar enterprises have done in other countries. Of the 37 antidumping cases that have been 
completed, 26 have been from the steel, chemicals, and petrochemicals industries. Throughout 
the world, these industries have been frequent petitioners for antidumping actions. 
Other sectors, however, have not been satisfied with the usability of the safeguard and 
antidumping instruments. The experience of the textiles and apparel sector is illustrative. Even 
though tariffs on textile and apparel imports are relatively high (average 18 percent), trade 
liberalization produced a substantial increase of imports, and with the increase in imports came 
an increase in complaints about evasion of import duties (smuggling) and imports from Asia at 
very low prices. The sector soon became a user of the trade defense mechanisms: Three 
antidumping investigations and six safeguard investigations were undertaken on its behalf. 
Preliminary measures as a result of these investigations brought a request from several 
Asian exporters for WTO consultations, but the matter was dropped when the measures expired 
and were not renewed. In 1997, the government, concerned that protection for the textile industry 
would disadvantage apparel producers, worked out an industry development plan with the 
industry that included temporary tariff reductions on capital goods and raw materials, stronger 
enforcement of smuggling controls, and modification of safeguard and antidumping 
procedures—within WTO Safeguards Agreement parameters—to expedite investigations and 
introduce flexibility into the criteria for application. 
Experiences such as these brought forward a perceived need for an instrument that 
imposes less stringent administrative and substantive standards.  In response, the government in 
1999 established a second safeguard mechanism, called a special safeguard, or safeguard by 
reason of disruption. This instrument allows an increase of the tariff rate up to the level of 
Colombia’s WTO ceiling binding, an action that does not violate Columbia’s obligations under 
the GATT and the WTO agreements. Thus, the investigation and determination do not have to 
meet the requirements of the WTO safeguards agreement for the increased import duty to be 
legal by WTO’s standards. The special safeguard’s standard—disruption—is interpreted as the   17
existence of imports in unfair conditions such as low prices or an important increase of 
quantities. It does not require an adjustment plan, but this restriction can be in place for a 
maximum of two years and is not extendable. The study’s authors, Reina and Zuluaga, found in 
their interviews that the business community considers this instrument to be user-friendly.  
The largest number of safeguard actions by Colombia has come under another form of 
safeguard—the provision in the Andean Community that allows for suspension of the benefits 
from the free trade area, imposing the tariff rate applicable to imports from outside the 
community. On a provisional basis, actions such as these may be taken unilaterally but cannot be 
retained without the approval of the Community Secretariat. The study’s authors learned from 
interviews that the secretariat review requires approximately four months to complete. The rules 
for this safeguard impose no limit on how long a measure—if approved—may be in place. 
Approval may, however, impose such a limit.  Table 1 documents the popularity of the less 
stringent instruments. 
Colombia has undertaken four investigations for Andean Community safeguards on 
agricultural products, with restrictions in place intermittently from 1996 through 2003. These 
measures became an issue within the Andean Community and led to the creation of a special 
arrangement in the Ministry of Agriculture to administer contingent duties. 
While the worldwide statistics show one safeguard case for every 55 antidumping cases, 
the ratio for Colombia is nearly one to one. Moreover, 13 of 20 safeguard applications were not 
dependent on the Safeguards Agreement for their WTO legality.   18
Lesson 
In Colombia’s case, we find that the substantive content of the WTO rules on trade 
defense instruments has not been sufficiently valuable to overcome the administrative demands 
that these instruments put on the government and the business community. Thus, Colombia’s 
experience has involved a unique element—the development and use of safeguard instruments 
that impose lesser administrative demands. As to the use of these instruments to restrict trade, the 
number of restrictions is in line with the numbers observed for other countries in the study. 
Moreover, the instruments have limits on the level of protection that can be applied. A special 
safeguard cannot increase the tariff above Colombia’s WTO bound rate, and an Andean 
Community safeguard cannot increase the level of protection above the rate applied to imports 
from outside the community. 
Antidumping Policies and Safeguard Measures in the Context of Costa Rica’s 
Economic Liberalization, by Ricardo Monge-González and Francisco Monge-
Ariño (WPS3591) 
The Costa Rican economic crisis in the early 1980s sparked an extensive review of the 
country’s situation. From this review came a decision to move away from the import-substitution 
policies then in place and, instead, to exploit the economy’s comparative advantages in the 
international economy. Initially, the strategy was to provide higher fiscal incentives, intended to 
reduce the antiexport bias in its trade restrictions. Soon after this decision, the government 
introduced an important reduction of import barriers along with other structural reforms that 
increased the openness of the economy to foreign trade and capital flows. The government 
devalued the colón and adopted a flexible exchange-rate regime. Since the mid-1980s, the real 
exchange rate has been stable. The policy changes attracted considerable foreign investment. 
Reforms in Costa Rica were complemented by the United States’ Caribbean Basin 
Initiative of 1984. Under this initiative, a significant share of Costa Rican exports enjoy zero 
tariffs in the United States. 
Costa Rica’s average most-favored nation (MFN) tariff by 2001 had fallen below 7 
percent, though rates are considerably higher for agricultural products than for industrial 
products. As part of its market access commitments under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, 
Costa Rica established tariff quotas for various agricultural products (for example, certain dairy 
and poultry products), and in almost all cases, the fill levels have been low. Moreover, Costa   19
Rica has introduced several special safeguard measures based on the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture. 
Costa Rican exports, approximately US$1 billion in 1984, had expanded to US$6 billion 
by 2003. This export growth was accompanied by an important diversification away from coffee, 
bananas, sugar, and beef. Other products accounted for 39 percent of total exports in 1982, but 
grew to 87 percent of total exports by 2003. Meanwhile, the services sector, particularly tourism, 
became a significant earner of foreign exchange. At the macroeconomic level, increased trade 
contributed to overall gross domestic product (GDP) growth; with growth came reduced 
unemployment and a substantial reduction in the share of the population below the poverty line. 
Regulations and Organization 
Costa Rican regulations on unfair trade practices have been reviewed and adapted to the 
agreements that were signed within the framework of the Uruguay Round. Costa Rica has also 
adopted the Regulations on Unfair Business Practices of the Central American Common Market, 
or Mercado Común Centroamericano, which provide for antidumping action by one member 
against exports from another member and for common action against exports from an outside 
country. Bilateral arrangements with Canada, Chile, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico 
recognize the rights of the parties to take antidumping action under the GATT and WTO 
agreements. 
In 1995, to administer safeguard and unfair trade instruments, the government created an 
Office of Unfair Trade Practices and Safeguard Measures, reporting to the Ministry of Economy, 
Industry, and Trade (MEIC). Because of relatively high operating costs in relation to the number 
of petitions, the government closed this office in 2000 and assigned its responsibilities to the 
Legal Office of the MEIC. Technical investigations are done by the Economics Department of 
the MEIC. Unlike the other countries discussed here, Costa Rica has no specialized agency to 
administer antidumping and safeguard investigations. 
Experience 
Costa Rica appears to be a country where import-substitution industries, particularly in 
the manufacturing sector, have accepted the challenges of adopting an open economy model of   20
development. Costa Rica’s experience comprises eleven contingent protection cases: six 
antidumping petitions and five safeguard petitions.  
Of the six antidumping complaints, two were dropped because the complainant did not 
submit the information required to support an investigation. No dumping or injury was found in 
two cases, and in one case, injury was found but attributed to causes other than imports. In the 
one case that reached an affirmative final determination, by the time the investigation was 
completed imports had dropped virtually to zero. An antidumping duty of 0 percent was 
imposed. 
The outcome of one of these cases demonstrates the government’s concern to promote 
competition. When a petitioner requested that an investigation be terminated because it had 
reached an agreement with the exporter, MEIC continued the investigation under its own 
initiative. MEIC in time concluded that no import restriction was warranted, and then notified the 
Commission to Promote Competition so that it could investigate the arrangement between the 
parties involved. In another instance, the investigation revealed that the problem was under-
invoicing and smuggling; the problem was handled through the appropriate legal institutions. 
Of the five applications for safeguard action, only one has resulted in a restrictive 
measure being imposed. The National Cabuya Board applied in September 1995 for an 
investigation against imports of coarse fiber bags, used primarily to package coffee for export. 
The subsequent investigation did verify a substantial increase of imports of bags. It found also a 
substantial increase of coffee exports, but not one sufficient to explain the increase of imports of 
bags without a substantial displacement of Costa Rican production. The MEIC imposed a 
provisional measure, a duty increase to 140 percent, but asked the producers of bags for a 
commitment to improve and expand their capacity. When after six months domestic producers 
had not initiated that action, the provisional measure was withdrawn. 
The few requests for protection that the government has been called on to manage are an 
obvious indication that the business community is an active partner in the new economic 
strategy. Though many Costa Rican enterprises began under the umbrella of the previous import-
substitution model, many have succeeded in transforming into exporters, including two 
enterprises that applied for antidumping protection a decade ago. Another indication is that, 
although the MEIC has issued a decree to establish a new office to specialize in unfair trade and   21
safeguard matters, there has not been sufficient pressure from the business community for it to be 
created. Administration of matters such as these remains with the MEIC’s Legal Office and 
Economics Department. 
Lessons 
In Costa Rica as in Chile, the major element in the explanation of why antidumping and 
safeguard action has been minimal is that the business community is an active partner in the new 
economic strategy. (The fact that sensitive agricultural products remain highly protected should 
not be overlooked.) In this environment, the government is able to provide a strictly disciplined 
industrial policy. An industry actively seeking to achieve international levels of productivity and 
product quality will be supported whereas an industry seeking protection from international 
competition will not. Also important is the record of good macroeconomic management by the 
government. The real exchange rate has been stable, and the rate of inflation has been low. There 
has been no challenge in Costa Rica to take on macroeconomic problems with microeconomic 
tools. 
 
Antidumping and Safeguard Measures in the Political Economy of 
Liberalization: The Mexican Case, by Luz Elena Reyes de la Torre and Jorge G. 
González (WPS3684) 
Creating instruments of commercial defense was part of the bargain that the Mexican 
government struck with industry to win its support for opening the economy to international 
competition. At the same time, the government recognized that care must be taken to ensure that 
the commercial defense “monster” remained chained to the service of the trade liberalization 
program and did not develop a momentum of its own. 
There was some risk that it would. Antidumping, at least in rhetoric, was intended to sort 
fair from unfair international competition. The government was aware that the instrument was 
tainted by its protectionist use in other countries, hence its reluctance to unquestioningly follow 
procedures as they had evolved in traditional users. 
The Mexican case explains how the government developed operational techniques to sort 
unwanted competition from the competition that would serve their policy objectives: benefit 
consumers and stimulate the efficiency of the economy. The WTO rules’ tolerance for import   22
restrictions is more generous than is the concept that the Mexican government concluded would 
serve the national economic interest. 
The Mexican case demonstrates the need for the technical capacity to operate commercial 
defenses correctly. It also demonstrates the need for skilled political management to take an 
emergency action that would save political support for trade liberalization without allowing that 
action to shift the central tendency of the system—in other words, to ensure that an exception 
remain an exception. 
International Competition—Normal versus Abnormal 
Two examples illustrate how the Mexican government has made operational the concept 
of separating normal international competition from unfair or distorted competition. In the first 
example, diiodohydroxyquinoline is an ingredient in a medicine important in Mexico. It is 
produced only in Germany, India, and Mexico, and the Mexican producer who brought an 
antidumping case against the Indian producer is an affiliate of a German producer. The Indian 
market was at the time highly protected. Therefore, the home market price was considerably 
above the normal international price—the price that the Mexican government considered 
appropriate to distinguish normal international competition from dumping. The Mexican 
government’s decision was to impose a duty of US$4.09 per kilo rather than the full dumping 
margin of US$15.56 per kilo. In its investigation, the government concluded that a duty equal to 
the full dumping margin would drive the Indian supplier out of the Mexican market and 
eliminate competition there. In such situations, Mexico applies the lesser duty rule. 
In the second example, after conducting an investigation of imports of bond paper, the 
government concluded that the suppliers accused of dumping were doing so to meet the price set 
by more efficient suppliers. The government imposed no antidumping duty, the conclusion being 
that injury suffered by Mexican producers resulted from their having to compete with normal 
international competition rather than with dumping. 
In the schema in table 2, the diiodohydroxyquinoline case would fall in the second row; 
the bond paper case, in the third. Only in the first situation described in the first row of the table 
would the Mexican government apply an antidumping duty.   23
Emergency Measures 
In mid-1993, the Mexican government was in a critical stage of its liberalization 
program. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations—ostensibly completed 
in 1992—had been reopened in early 1993 by the insistence of the new U.S. administration of 
President Bill Clinton that parallel agreements on labor and on the environment be included. The 
Mexican government had to maintain the national consensus needed to complete negotiation of 
the treaty and to gain its approval by its Congress 
By this time, Mexican trade barriers had been significantly reduced, and inflation had 
brought approximately 30 percent appreciation of the real exchange rate. Imports by 1992 were 
five times their level in 1987, an increase of more than 30 percent per year. Industry pressed hard 
for the government to keep its promise to apply antidumping measures to provide relief in this 
emergency situation. Were the government not to respond, it would risk loss of credibility for the 
system of contingent protection and, with it, the ongoing trade liberalization program. 
The most focused pressure came from the Mexican steel industry. It was familiar with 
antidumping procedures, having been the target of U.S. and European measures several times. 
The industry presented a package of petitions that covered nearly all basic products and 
supplying countries. The Mexican government, however, was reluctant to act on these petitions. 
Use of antidumping measures by the U.S. government to protect its steel industry had played a 
major role in capture there of the instrument for protectionist purposes. Moreover, an increase of 
steel prices would be a burden on user industries and exporters. 
At the same time, producers of a broad range of final goods—including clothing, toys, 
shoes, and electrical appliances—came forward with intense complaints about low-priced 
imports, particularly from China. These producers, however, were minimally organized and 
unfamiliar with antidumping procedures. 
The government’s strategy included immediate action on a range of final goods from 
China. As soon as the government self-initiated investigations on more than 3,000 tariff lines, it 
installed preliminary duties that ranged from 129 percent to more than 1,000 percent. (Because 
part of the discipline the government had built into its antidumping rules included strict standards 
on the information a petitioner must supply, it would have been time-consuming, perhaps 
impossible, for these producers to pull together a package of petitions.) Product coverage was   24
carefully selected to exclude duties on any products used as inputs by Mexican producers. 
Moreover, China was not at the time a GATT contracting party; hence, Mexico’s duties would 
violate its international commitments.  
In contrast with their immediate action on the package of final goods, the government 
delayed action on petitions from the steel industry. Although most investigations were opened in 
1993, the measures that were applied came near the end of 1995. In the interval, the government 
examined carefully where Mexican production could be expanded with minimal increase of cost 
to users. It also created a system of certificates of final use to exempt critical inputs from duties 
but, at the same time, ensure that these products did not substitute for products that Mexican 
producers could supply. The duties imposed were much lower than those imposed on final 
goods, mostly in the range of 30 to 50 percent ad valorem. 
Mexico’s 83 antidumping initiations in 1993 were more than the number for any other 
country. However, after devaluation of the peso in December 1994 relieved pressure for use of 
commercial defense measures, Mexico averaged 8 initiations per year from 1995 through June 
2004, as compared with 40 by India, 37 by the United States, 30 by the European Union. The 
emergency action was indeed an exception.  
Lessons 
Creating and using contingent protection instruments has been a fundamental part of 
establishing the new open economy of Mexico. The political promise that the government made 
to industry at the beginning of Mexican liberalization was to provide relief from unfair 
competition while otherwise expecting Mexican industry to compete with the best in the world. 
The administrative unit and procedures established in Mexico show how the good sense of this 
promise can be translated into sound and impartial professional action. Mexican experience 
demonstrates that good policy management requires more than technical skill. The political 
acumen to judge when to emphasize the technical dimensions and when not to, was critical.  
Antidumping Mechanisms and Safeguards in Peru, by Richard Webb, Josefina 
Camminati, and Raúl León Thorne (WPS3658) 
Peru began its recent economic reforms in the face of a particularly severe economic and 
political crisis. Inflation raged in triple digits, and domestic production had fallen drastically. A 
collapse of public revenues brought severe reduction of public services, including courts,   25
schools, and police. Increasing terrorism from Sendero Luminoso and Túpac Amaru groups 
added to the decline of public order. The multiple exchange rate system, along with high and 
distorted tariff rates, created effective rates of protection of more than 250 percent for some 
sectors and negative rates for others. Import prohibitions applied to 540 tariff lines that covered 
almost one-fourth of domestic production; another 534 tariff lines were subject to quantitative 
restrictions. 
The trade reforms that began after Alberto Fujimori became president differed from 
previous reforms in several ways. In the election campaign of 1990, the liberal message—
principally from unsuccessful candidate Mario Vargas Llosa—was no longer dismissed as a front 
for business interests. Liberalization was widely accepted as a way to advance the public interest, 
not simply as a desperate means to take on an economic crisis. (Fujimori had not campaigned on 
a liberal platform, but his practical perception of the emergency situation led him toward liberal 
policies.) 
The government wanted to do more than just remove existing restrictions. It wanted to 
institutionalize trade policy decisions as well as install technical criteria and a unified evaluation 
system for protection requests. Previously, decisions on tariff rates, levels of quantitative 
restrictions, and import bans as well as decisions about which enterprises would receive tariff 
exemptions had been made by sector officials who operated with almost complete discretion. 
The lack of structure generated business uncertainty and permitted a high level of political 
interference. 
Institutional Reform and Indecopi  
The centerpiece of institutional reform was the Indecopi (Instituto Nacional de Defensa 
de la Competencia y de la Protección de la Propiedad Intelectual, or National Institute for the 
Defense of Competition and the Protection of Intellectual Property). Indecopi was created in 
1993 to administer the new economic rules and actively defend the market system against the 
lobby-based political erosions that had undermined previous reforms. 
Indecopi is headed by a president and an Executive Board who are appointed by the 
president of Peru. The work of Indecopi is done by seven commissions, independent of one 
another, whose members are appointed by the Executive Board. The establishing regulation   26
requires that each member be an experienced technical expert in the field that his or her 
commission will regulate. Each commission is served by a Technical Secretariat. 
Role of the Indecopi Commissions 
The Indecopi commissions are the major public organs for maintaining a competitive 
market economy in Peru. The Commission on Technical Standards, for example, is responsible 
not only for maintaining systems of standards but also for ensuring that businesses do not use 
them to retard competition. 
The Commission for Control of Dumping and Subsidies   (CDS; La Comisión de 
Fiscalización de Dumping y Subsidios), created in 1991, was made a part of Indecopi when it 
was established. When the CDS was created it incorporated the requirements of the relevant 
GATT codes; it has since incorporated the Uruguay Round agreements into its criteria and 
procedures. The CDS is the investigating and deciding agency on matters of antidumping and 
countervailing duties. On safeguards, however, the CDS conducts the investigation, but the 
decision rests with the Multisector Commission, which is made up of representatives of the 
Ministries of Economy and Finance, Industry, and Production for the sector on behalf of which 
the investigation was conducted. 
The antidumping-safeguard procedural difference reflects a difference in the economics 
that lies between the two instruments. Dumping and subsidies are considered to be practices that 
create distortions to be evaluated against technical criteria. Under the economic philosophy of 
the system, a distortion merits correction; it creates an inequality between private versus social 
costs and benefits. A safeguard action responds, however, to what is considered a political 
situation. Technical analysis is needed to gauge the extent of injury and to assure that it results 
from import competition. Nevertheless, the decision must balance the importance of the various 
effects that will follow from the proposed action on consumers, production, and employment, not 
only on the sector that petitioned for protection but also on other sectors and on other dimensions 
of the national interest such as the viability of the politics of openness. An industry that petitions 
for safeguard relief not only must document an increase of imports and consequent injury but 
also must submit (a) an adjustment plan and (b) an economic report that quantifies the impact of 
the requested measure on final and intermediate consumers and on the public interest.   27
Outcome 
The CDS and the other Indecopi commissions have provided an example of how public 
decisions can be made in a transparent manner, in accord with objective, published criteria. They 
have won the confidence of the public as different from the traditional bureaucracy, both in the 
quality of their work and in the public’s perception of whom they serve. The public media played 
an important role, publicizing commission decisions that favored consumers and commission 
efforts to facilitate the operations of small businesses. 
As to the CDS in particular, in its early years, it established a pattern of disciplined 
procedure. As noted in table 3, from 1993 to 2000, the CDS imposed an average of only 1.4 
antidumping measures per year. Moreover, standards for the content of a petition kept the 
number of investigations relatively low. 
With the change in 2001 to the government of Alejandro Toledo (and already during the 
temporary government of Valentín Paniagua in 2000), the industrial lobby strove to identify the 
removal of import restrictions as being among the excesses of the Fujimori government and 
discredit the hard-line technical and independent approach to determining trade policy that the 
Indecopi and the CDS represent.  
A safeguard petition on behalf of the textiles and clothing sector became an important 
vehicle for the pressure. The protection seekers opted for a safeguard petition because it offered 
greater possibility to minimize the technical input and bring trade union and other political 
pressures to bear. In the debate over whether to protect textiles and clothing producers, the major 
argument against restriction has been the damage to the Peruvian economy that retaliation from 
China would bring. This argument is being advanced by export industries, their trade unions, and 
the Embassy of China in Peru. As this country study was completed in August 2004, the option 
toward which the government was inclined was to shift from transitional safeguards against 
China (allowed under China’s terms of accession to the WTO) to generalized safeguards. 
The change of government also initiated a struggle to replace Indecopi’s commissioners. 
The new commissioners have closer ties to industry, and they have focused on enterprise 
insolvency resulting from the 1997 banking crisis and have redirected resources toward issues of 
enterprise restructuring. Matters of market structure and free competition have received less 
attention.   28
As to decisions on trade issues, there has been an increase in the share and in the number 
of cases with restrictive outcomes. The numbers, however, are still low. Authors Webb, 
Camminati, and Thorne report that, although decisions are now more influenced by the industrial 
sector, the technical quality of investigations has not been lost.  
Lessons 
The positive lesson we draw from Peruvian experience is the example it provides of a 
unified, independent, and technically oriented decision structure. Peru’s experience demonstrates 
that such an institution is not impervious to political pressure; however, the institution has 
maintained its technical integrity. Equally important, the idea of a unified decision structure 
rather than a sector specific approach has prevailed. 
Not all the political considerations that have entered into trade policy determinations have 
pushed in the protectionist direction. In the debate over whether to protect textiles and clothing 
producers, the major argument against restriction is the damage to the Peruvian economy that 
retaliation from exporters would bring. This argument is being advanced by export industries, 
their trade unions, and the embassies of exporting countries. 
II.  SCOPE AND BACKGROUND OF THE REFORMS 
Each of the reform experiences began in periods of macroeconomic crisis; hence, a major 
part of the dynamic behind them was to control inflation and restore macroeconomic balance. 
Microeconomic reforms included much more than removal of trade restrictions. Major sectors of 
the economy previously dominated by public enterprises were privatized; foreign investment 
rules were liberalized. In many countries, commercial legal codes were extensively revised, with 
new emphasis on creating and maintaining competition in domestic markets. With respect to 
trade policy, although the application of extensive import restrictions during the second half of 
the last century had promoted some diversification of production, it also had fostered 
concentrated property structures, high prices, low product quality, and few incentives for 
modernization. 
Trade liberalization was novel in speed, depth, and scope. Import licensing requirements 
and quantitative restrictions were almost entirely removed. Applied tariff rates that had averaged 
50 percent or more in the 1970s and 1980s have fallen by three-fourths and, in Chile and Costa   29
                                                
Rica, to well below 10 percent. Regional arrangements such as Mercosur, the Andean 
Community, the Central American Common Market, and NAFTA have been mechanisms for 
additional liberalization. (For example, two-thirds of Mexico’s imports are from the United 
States and are thereby duty-free under NAFTA.) Separate protection regimes were maintained 
for agriculture in several countries, but import-sensitive manufactured goods were not excluded 
from the liberalization. There was no Multifiber Arrangement, no special arrangement for 
textiles and clothing among these countries. 
In their economic histories, the seven countries had passed through several cycles of 
protection and openness. Although it is common to describe the periods of protection as 
application of an import-substitution strategy, swings toward protection are more accurately 
described as accumulations of political victories by protection- and subsidy-seeking interests – 
not as a coherent applications of any particular economic strategy
1. Many different import 
control instruments were in use: tariffs, surcharges, benchmark customs values, enterprise-
specific limits on foreign purchases, and import prohibitions. Application of restrictions was 
done through processes that allowed wide discretion to government officials, with decisions 
often made at the sectoral level. Safeguards and antidumping—as GATT and WTO rules define 
them—were rarely used. With almost all tariff lines unbound through the GATT, WTO, or other 
international agreements, the international sanction that use of such instruments would have 
provided was not needed. 
The reforms of the 1980s and 1990s took place as these countries increasingly saw the 
advantages of active participation in the GATT and WTO systems. At the Uruguay Round, they 
accepted ceilings on almost all tariff lines; hence, for any duty increase beyond these bindings, 
they would need the clearance that use of a GATT- or WTO-sanctioned instrument would 
provide. Moreover, there was widespread realization that, to prevent the eventual erosion of this 
round of liberalization, new institutions for managing trade policy would be needed—institutions 
 
1. Thirty years ago, Bela Balassa began the preface to his pathbreaking study, The Structure of Protection in 
Developing Countries (1971), by noting that an import-substitution policy was the rationale for the trade policies of 
many developing countries. He went on to point out that  
whatever the intrinsic merits of this policy, its application has rarely been based on a consistent program of action. 
Rather, the existing system of protection in many developing countries can be described as the historical result of 
actions taken at different times and for different reasons. These actions have been in response to the particular 
circumstances of the situation, and have often been conditioned by the demands of special interest groups. The 
authorities have generally assumed a permissive attitude toward requests for protection and failed to inquire into the 
impact of the measures applied on other industries and on the allocation of resources in the national economy. (xv)   30
that would help to control the emergence of many instruments and unify the application of the 
instruments into a policy process that would bring forward the economic logic of how openness 
would support economic development. The two sides of the issue reinforced each other: while 
the need for reform suggested the value of active WTO membership, active WTO membership 
required the use of approved instruments. 
Thus, these liberalizations differed from past ones in more than their scope and depth. An 
important element was to institutionalize the changes that were made through the acceptance of 
GATT and WTO bindings and the adoption of WTO-sanctioned trade defense or contingent 
protection instruments. 
Creating trade defense mechanisms was often part of the bargain to gain industry 
acceptance of liberalization. Industries find trade defense mechanisms attractive because a 
safeguard mechanism can slow the pace of liberalization where its impact turns out to be 
particularly severe. In principle, an antidumping mechanism will allow domestic industries to be 
exposed to normal international competition but, at the same time, be protected from unfair 
competition. 
From the perspective of maintaining the momentum of liberalization, these mechanisms, 
once in place, should serve as a means to accommodate and isolate pressures that might 
otherwise grow into large-scale threats; they should allow the possibility of one step back to 
preserve two steps forward. In each country, trade liberalization did generate substantial 
increases of imports, hence the need for mechanisms to manage these pressures. Thus, 
maintaining an economically sensible trade policy was, in significant part, a matter of managing 
pressures for exceptions—for protection for a particular industry—so that the exceptions 
remained exceptions and the decision process reinforced, rather than undermined, the politics of 
liberalization. 
An additional virtue of these mechanisms is that they would contribute to a shift of the 
culture of policy management that reform leaders wanted to advance: a shift to a culture of 
policy management based on facts of economic potential—unified, objective, and transparent 
mechanisms—from one based on relationships. Finally, trade regulations would form a part of 
the new regulatory structure intended to create a more competitive environment than existed 
before.   31
                                                
III.  TRADE DEFENSE USE—THE OVERALL RECORD 
Trade defense mechanisms are instruments for imposing import restrictions rather than 
for removing them. Their creation raises the possibility of overuse: Have they been used so much 
as to substantially offset the liberalization that they were intended to promote?  
With regard to applied tariff rates, table 4 presents the tariffs on industrial goods for 
seven countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and Peru. 
The record of use of antidumping, countervailing duties, and safeguard investigations and 
measures since 1995 (as notified to the WTO) are presented in tables 5 through 8. Tables 5 and 6 
list the numbers of antidumping investigations and measures by the seven countries, as notified 
to the WTO. Countervailing duties have been minimally used; since 1996, only nine measures in 
total by the seven countries in the study (table 7). Safeguard actions have also been infrequent. 
Over the same period, Chile has notified the WTO of seven safeguard measures, three 
preliminary and four definitive measures. All have been tariff measures at rates below 15 percent 
and in place for no longer than 12 months. No other country in the group has applied more than 
three safeguard measures. 
Tables 5 and 6 list the numbers of antidumping investigations and measures notified by 
the seven countries. For the countries in this study, as for other WTO members, antidumping has 
been by far the most frequently used mechanism for managing pressures for exceptional 
protection,
2 Colombia’s use of within-bindings safeguards being the only exception. Several of 
the countries studied were, for short periods, major users of trade defense measures. Chile, in the 
early 1980s, initiated more countervailing duty cases than any other GATT member; Mexico, in 
1993, initiated more antidumping investigations than any other GATT contracting party. The 
country studies show, however, that these cases were truly emergency actions, coming at critical 
times in the trade liberalization process. Through the use of trade defense measures and other 
actions, governments were able to complete critical steps, and the rate of use dropped radically 
afterward. 
Although trade defense measures are, in theory, intended to deal with other matters, these 
country studies show that an overvalued exchange rate often creates the conditions in which a 
 
2. Together, WTO members have initiated more than 2,500 antidumping investigations since 1995, compared with 
174 countervailing duty investigations and 142 safeguard investigations.    32
                                                
safeguard or antidumping investigation will return an affirmative determination. The Argentine 
study provides an explicit demonstration
3. Exchange rate overvaluation was part of the situations 
in Chile and Mexico mentioned in the above reflections, and the Brazil study also describes an 
incident in which overvaluation brought intense pressure for import protection. The record 
shows, however, that when the exchange rate was appropriately adjusted, use of trade defenses 
quickly receded. 
IV.  RATIONALE FOR ANTIDUMPING MECHANISMS 
The rationale for antidumping enforcement in Latin American countries tends to focus on 
the economic concept of distortion. A distortion exists when the price of a product does not equal 
its cost of production in a competitive environment. In modern economics, as opposed to the 
mercantilist economics from which the concept of dumping is drawn, the national economic 
interest, or economic welfare, would be higher if the distortion did not exist. A distortion thus 
justifies government intervention in the market. 
When they established their procedures, Latin American governments were aware from 
analysis of antidumping systems in traditional users such as the United States and the European 
Union that dumping in its legal sense—even more than in its theoretical sense—did not identify 
circumstances in which government intervention would advance the national economic interest. 
Antidumping enforcement would use neither the exporter’s home market price nor the 
constructed cost
4 as the measure of what price should be. Instead, the price that enforcement 
attempted to reach would be the prevailing international price in competitive markets. Such 
interpretation followed the promise that governments had made to industry when they created the 
antidumping mechanisms; industry would be expected to adjust to normal international 
competition but would be protected from extraordinary situations. 
The latitude provided by WTO rules allowed governments to accommodate at two levels 
the mismatch between the economic theory on which WTO rules were based and the concept 
that justified government intervention. At the level of antidumping investigation, WTO rules 
 
3. Econometric studies based on information from other countries confirm that the business cycle influences the use 
of antidumping and other trade defenses. For example, see Leidy (1997) and Takacs (1981).  
4. The WTO rules sanction constructed cost formulas that allow generous overstatement of what normal business 
accounting practices would determine.   33
allow, in certain circumstances, the use of third-market price as the measure of normal value. An 
internationally competitive environment could be chosen as this third market. The more general 
basis for latitude is that the WTO rules do not demand that an antidumping duty be equal to the 
measured dumping margin. The duty cannot be larger, but it can be smaller, even zero. Latin 
American governments adopted the lesser duty rule, which, in theory, provides that the 
antidumping duty be set no higher than the level necessary to eliminate injury to domestic 
producers. 
Although the lesser duty rule is sometimes described as being allowed by the WTO 
antidumping agreement, given that WTO members did not give up their sovereign right to set a 
lower duty by accepting the agreement, there is no need for a WTO rule to create that right. 
Within the rules, a WTO member can set an antidumping duty at any level determined with 
reference to any criterion the government considers appropriate—limited by the measured 
dumping margin. Because the rules for measuring the dumping margin are generous, once an 
affirmative determination is returned, the latitude is considerable. 
Similarly, these countries included in their antidumping processes a national interest 
clause that allows the deciding agency to take no action or to modify action if the national 
interest would thereby be better served. Again, this action is a right not given up by accepting to 
abide by the WTO agreement; it is not a privilege granted by the agreement. The country studies 
explain additional criteria and limits governments included in their mechanisms. 
V.  RATIONALE FOR SAFEGUARD MECHANISMS 
Though they have been infrequently used, safeguard regulations are in place in each of 
the seven countries. The Peru study provides a sharp example of the difference in philosophy 
behind safeguards and antidumping. Antidumping is a technical matter; a distortion compromises 
economic welfare (the national economic interest) and therefore should be corrected. A 
safeguard action responds to a political situation. Technical analysis is needed to gauge the 
extent of injury and assure that it results from import competition. The decision should, however, 
balance the importance of the various effects that will follow from the proposed action on 
consumers, production, and employment, not only in the sector that petitioned for protection but 
also in other sectors. The decision should also take into account other matters such as how action 
or inaction would affect the viability of the liberalization process and the possibility of retaliation   34
                                                
by exporting countries. In Peru, an industry that petitions for safeguard relief not only must 
document an increase of imports and consequent injury but also must submit an adjustment plan 
and an economic report that quantifies the effect of the requested measure on final and 
intermediate consumers and on the public interest. 
In practice, the most frequent users of safeguards have been Chile and Colombia. In 
Chile, increased import duties have been used on isolated occasions to provide short-term 
breathing space for domestic enterprises beset by competition from imports. Colombia’s use of 
safeguards differs in that the most frequently used safeguard instrument avoids the procedural 
and substantive requirements of the WTO agreement by restraining restrictive action within the 
ceiling bindings the government has accepted at the WTO. 
The Argentine experience is also illustrative. The trade commission there turned down 
eight of the first nine safeguard requests it received; the response by protection seekers was to 
apply for relief under antidumping regulations. In theory, antidumping applies only when an 
economic distortion can be identified, but in practice, its standards overlap considerably with the 
injury standard of safeguards. Moreover, when qualifying for antidumping relief, an industry 
need not meet the safeguard requirements to provide a workable recovery plan nor subject itself 
to review of how its protection will affect consumers or production in other sectors. Though 
different in theory, antidumping and safeguards have proven in practice to be quite fungible. In 
practice, the use of one versus the other is a matter of administrative or political convenience, not 
of the economics of the underlying situation
5. 
VI.  DECISION-MAKING BODIES 
Although each country’s contingent protection processes have at their base a capacity to 
conduct investigations and reach determinations in accordance with the WTO rules, 
arrangements for deciding the restriction that will be imposed vary considerably. In antidumping 
cases, Argentina and Peru, for example, have created primarily technical mechanisms. The 
technical factors along with the independence and the analytical skills of the commission 
members are paramount. In contrast, Brazil entrusts the decision—once a technical 
 
5. Finger (2002) provides a general review of the point, drawing evidence from the evolution of use of GATT–WTO 
pressure-valve instruments since the GATT was first adopted.   35
                                                
determination is reached—to a vote by an overview board whose members come from a number 
of ministries that represent a diversity of interests. Colombia likewise entrusts the decision to an 
interministerial body, presided over by the country’s president. 
Chile has a system that controls application of contingent protection measures at several 
levels. At the administrative level, general interest government agencies dominate the 
commission that reviews technical determinations and prepares a recommendation for policy 
action. The commission is chaired by an official from the agency of government responsible for 
enforcing competition policy, and the final decision is made by the country’s president. At the 
statutory level, only tariff surcharges may be applied, for no more than one year. A restriction 
that will increase the tariff above the bound rate requires approval of three fourths of the 
members of the commission. Moreover, consumers are recognized as interested parties. 
No factor is more important to the disciplined use of contingent protection than the 
widespread support for the economic philosophy of openness. This point is made in each country 
study. The Chilean and Costa Rican studies particularly bring out the importance of deep 
constituent support for the economic philosophy of openness and constituent appreciation of the 
value of a competitive economy. 
Costa Rica has no specialized agency to conduct contingent protection investigations. 
They are part of the normal workload of the legal and economics staffs of the trade ministry. The 
positive side of this arrangement is that a staff with more general responsibilities might remain 
more sensitive to general economic interests than a specialized staff. Because the technical work 
in an antidumping or safeguard investigation amounts in substance to document foreign 
unfairness and displacement of domestic production by imports, professionalism can take on a 
pro-protection slant
6.  
It should be noted that Chile and Costa Rica have maintained relatively high protection 
for agriculture, and that they have a good record for macroeconomic stability, low inflation, and 
stable exchange rates. There has been no challenge to take on macroeconomic problems with 
trade instruments. 
 
6. For example, Boltuck and Litan (1991) document the biases in the administration of U.S. regulations.   36
VII. SOURCES OF DISCIPLINE 
After reviewing the country studies, we can look again at a question posed at the 
beginning of the paper. Because safeguard and antidumping are instruments that, by their nature, 
impose import restrictions, where did policy managers find discipline over application? What 
helped promote acceptance of negative decisions? 
The administrative content of WTO rules has made an invaluable contribution. A major 
source of erosion of previous liberalizations had been the tendency for instruments to proliferate, 
often controlled by different ministries and not unified by process or by criteria. Ministries most 
closely associated with industrial sectors were not counterbalanced by ministries with 
overreaching responsibilities or by consumer or import user interests. (In politics, concentrated 
interests have the advantage over more–dispersed interests, with that advantage being multiplied 
when decision making is at the sectoral level.) The WTO rules not only supported unification of 
process and criteria but also provided a template for objectivity; public notice of criteria, 
participation and access to information by interested parties, and publication of the legal and 
factual basis for decisions. They provided guidelines for objectivity, transparency, and 
accountability in public decision making, contributing not only to better trade policy but also to 
change of the policy management culture. 
An important source of discipline has been the rigorous standard for the information that 
a protection-seeking industry was required to supply, both for initiation of an investigation and 
as evidence to support the impact of international competition on the industry. Peru also imposes 
an application fee, currently about US$925.  
Effectiveness with respect to the continuance of liberalization has been a matter not only 
of the judicious application of WTO requirements but also of the skilled use of the discretion 
they allow.  In Mexico, the steel industry was familiar with WTO-based instruments, having 
been party to actions applied by the United States and the European Union against their exports. 
Other sectors found the administrative demands more formidable. When the survival of the 
liberalization program depended on such action, the Mexican government self-initiated 
investigations that involved smaller-scale producers of toys, clothing, and other consumer 
products. The combination of strict information requirements and the government’s authority to 
self-initiate investigations provided a valuable degree of discretion. At the same time, the   37
government used the discretion in its regulations to proceed more slowly with the investigation 
of the complaints by the steel industry and work out specific mechanisms to bring user interests 
into play. 
In Colombia, the steel, chemicals, and petrochemicals industries adapted quickly to the 
information demands of the WTO-based system of trade defense. Sectors composed of smaller 
enterprises, however, found the requirements burdensome and, in time, convinced the 
government to created alternate trade defense mechanisms. Colombia’s WTO bindings discipline 
the use of these instruments. The adoption of a unified mechanism for alternate instruments is 
another source of discipline. 
The economic content of the WTO standards is another matter. Apart from the cost of 
demonstrating that the standards have been met, analysis of experience in other countries has 
shown that the standards required by the WTO agreements on safeguards and antidumping are 
generous in determining that petitioners are deserving of protection. Aware of this characteristic, 
the Latin American countries adopted their own additional bases for not taking action (for 
example, a national interest clause) or for limiting the degree of action that was taken (for 
example, a lesser duty rule).  
When Latin American governments included the straightforward economic sense of 
taking into account the negative impact of an import restriction on domestic users, protection-
seekers used the rules against them – pointed out that WTO rules do not require consideration of 
such elements, that procedures in ‘leading’ users do not include them.   
Another attempt to improve on the economics of the WTO rules was to base price 
comparisons on a measure of long-term international price.  Mexico’s experience is particularly 
relevant here.  Attempts to develop an operational measure of long term international price were 
however overwhelmed by references by protection-seekers to the idea of ‘constructed cost,’ 
around which GATT/WTO discussion has swarmed and which at a technical level has been long 
captured by protectionist interests.
7  Lacking support from WTO rules or negotiations, these 
attempts eventually waned. 
                                                 
7 This capture has been the subject of a voluminous literature on the ‘administrative bias’ in administration of 
antidumping rules.  Boltuck and Litan (1991) provide an earlier, Nelson Vandenbussche (2005) a later summing up 
on the point.   38
                                                
Latin American experiences confirm that the dumping and injury criteria required by 
WTO rules are generous. To keep the number and the degree of restrictions in check, the 
governments often had to depend on the discretionary authority they retained
8.  The economic 
content of the rules did not create political capital that governments could use to explain a 
negative response to a request for protection; governments had to use political capital otherwise 
gained to explain why protection was not given to a petitioner that the rules found to be 
deserving. 
VIII.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR WTO RULES 
The country studies reviewed here demonstrate that the WTO rules on safeguards and 
antidumping have proven to be essential and that the courage and skill of policy managers have 
proven to be indispensable in the sweeping trade liberalization that has taken place in Latin 
America trade policy over the past quarter century. 
In this final section, we ask how the WTO rules could have been even more useful and 
more supportive of the liberalization that these countries set out to achieve. To be effective, a 
policy manager must master the technicalities, but we have found that the effective use of 
safeguards and antidumping mechanisms is as much art as science. In areas of economic policy 
in which the advice to “follow the rules” has perhaps been overemphasized, we will restrict 
ourselves to general observations; we leave the crafting of negotiating proposals to people with 
expertise in such work. 
One might identify two objectives with respect to how international rules might shape 
domestic processes through which governments make decisions to impose protection. From 
perhaps an ideal perspective, one might hope that they would guide a country to identify those 
interventions that add more to the national economic interest than they take away. Eliminating 
distortions, in theory, follows from this perspective. 
The experiences studied here show, however, that there are instances in which other 
considerations make it impossible to avoid what might be an economically unsound trade 
intervention. In those situations, good policy becomes a more pragmatic matter, a matter of 
 
8. Although the discretionary authority that counties retained and the political review processes that countries 
superimposed over technical determinations in a number of instances led to a reduced level of restriction, there were 
few instances in which no restriction was imposed after an affirmative determination.   39
managing interventions to maintain the momentum of liberalization and strengthen the politics of 
avoiding, rather than of imposing, such restrictions in the future. 
The first objective is about economically good interventions versus economically bad; the 
second is—pragmatically speaking and over the long run—about less interventions rather than 
more. It is also about the number and form of interventions in the short run that, over the long 
run, will minimize opposition to liberalization. 
The Rules Are Too Generous 
Although the administrative dimensions of the rules have been supportive, the economic 
content has been less so. A key point that emerges from the country studies is that, from an 
economics perspective, WTO rules on safeguards and antidumping are too generous with respect 
to separating either good interventions from bad or less interventions from more. Although 
antidumping, in theory, is about interventions that make economic sense, in reality, WTO 
guidelines allow restrictions that amount to ordinary protection. Aware of this characteristic, 
Latin American governments attempted to make operational the economic concept of distortion. 
Qualitatively speaking, this concept would help them to separate trade interventions whose 
economics is good from interventions whose economics is bad. Sticking to the concept of 
distortion would also reduce the number of interventions that received sanction. At the same 
time, these governments introduced lesser duty rules and national interest clauses—additional 
bases not to restrict in instances in which the WTO rules would allow a restriction. 
The safeguard mechanisms that the governments set up also included disciplines not 
mandated by WTO rules. WTO safeguard rules require only an investigation and determination 
of injury from imports and of the cost that import competition imposes on competing domestic 
producers. They do not require that benefits to industrial users and to consumers likewise be 
taken into account. In the interest of reaching economically sensible safeguard decisions, Latin 
American governments supplemented their safeguard processes with requirements for an 
adjustment plan (and an economic report in the case of Peru) that quantifies the impact of the 
requested restriction on final and intermediate consumers and the public interest. The logic of the 
first of these is to assure that the protected industry will eventually be viable in an open economy 
and will not be a long-term burden on the rest of the economy. The logic of the second is that the 
imports that are an inconvenience for some domestic interests provide benefits for other   40
                                                
domestic interests—lower-priced and state-of-the-art inputs for domestic producers and final 
goods for consumers. 
Overcoming Conflicts Created by the Economic Content of the Rules 
The over-generosity of the economic content of the WTO rules leads to two points of 
conflict between the rules and the objective of defending liberalization: 
•  The case for protection has the weight of international obligation behind it whereas the limits 
that governments included in their regulations do not. 
•  Technical analysis is expected—politically—to work in favor of liberalization, yet its 
economics is to make the case for protection, to document the costs that liberalization 
imposes on some domestic interests. 
Latin American experience suggests a straightforward way to overcome these conflicts: 
mandate identification of the impact on users and consumers as well as the impact on competing 
domestic producers. The policy process would ask: Who in the domestic economy would benefit 
from the proposed import restriction, and who would lose? By how much? 
The technicalities would be simple: recognize domestic users and consumers as interested 
parties, and require that the investigation determine the effect on them of the proposed restriction 
in parallel with its determination of injury from trade to the protection seeker. The effect of the 
restriction on users and consumers would be measured in the same dimensions as injury—for 
example, jobs lost because of higher costs and lower profits—the standard metric of effect. The 
existing rules of procedure would apply to the investigation of the costs of protection equally 
with that of the benefits. All interests would be treated the same in process and in concept. 
Even in those instances in which the decision is to restrict imports, the process would bring 
forward the reasoning behind the liberalization, the benefits from openness. The limits that Latin 
American governments imposed on their use of trade defense measures would have been more 
effective against domestic pressures for protection if the reasons for minimizing use had had the 
force of international obligation behind them
9. 
 
9. Another conflict, perhaps more semantic than substantive, is between the national interest and the protection-
seeking industry’s interest. The protection seeker’s interest is part of, not other than, the national interest. The effect 
of a trade restriction on the national interest, in concept, should include the cost of protection and those who bear 
this cost, along with the benefits and those who receive these benefits. A shortcoming of an injury investigation is 
that it does not give equal standing to all parts of the national interest.   41
                                                
Beyond making economic sense, such a safeguard process would be politically balanced. 
It takes into account the effect of trade on all interests in the country: those that benefit from 
liberalization and those who are burdened. This balance would not be a matter of the technical 
versus the political. The benefits to trade for user interests would be measured in the same 
business and economic terms as the costs to protection seekers
10. 
A shortcoming of this suggestion is that it would increase the cost of an investigation, 
would impose administrative costs on potential victims of the restriction as well as on the 
potential beneficiaries. If however discipline over use were based on equal treatment of the costs 
of protection and its benefits rather than on the complexity of determining the benefits, then 
economies could be achieved without compromise to the viability of the information developed. 
The balanced cost-benefit process would have to be applied in antidumping 
investigations as well as in safeguard investigations. The situations to which antidumping or 
safeguards can be applied overlap considerably. Because antidumping’s popularity is not based 
on its unique identification of the existing business or economic situation, expanding the scope 
of the safeguard process would have the effect only of further increasing the use of antidumping 
in its place. 
Other than modifying the technical dimensions of investigations to include the gains from 
trade, the alternative for reform is further manipulation of the technicalities of determining 
dumping or injury. That manipulation—illustrated by the proposals submitted at the Doha 
Negotiations—is not about matching the operational guidelines more closely with the economic 
concepts of dumping (predatory pricing) or externality—in theory, situations in which a trade 
intervention provides a net addition to the national economic interest. This struggle over 
technicalities, we contend, will have little effect on the quality or the quantity of import 
restrictions that are applied.
11 There are sufficient technicalities that adding a few here, trimming 
 
10. The process could also be balanced in that users or consumer groups could petition for removal of an import 
restriction on the basis of the cost it imposed on them. History provides at least one example of a mechanism 
balanced in this way. Section 336 of the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930 empowered the U.S. president to increase or to 
decrease a tariff rate based on investigation by the U.S. Tariff Commission of the cost of producing the product in 
the United States compared with that cost in exporting countries. (The U.S. tariff would be set equal to the measured 
difference.) From 1931–41, the commission conducted investigations on 101 products. These investigations led to 
29 tariff increases and 25 tariff reductions; in the other 47 instances, the rate was not changed. 
11 Borrowing a concept from mathematics, the rules on trade remedies provide an over-determined system, e.g., 15 
equations to solve for 2 unknowns.  Operating the system requires mastery of its technicalities, e.g., how to solve 
simultaneous equations.  Within the technicalities there remain however many degrees of freedom.  Two equations   42
                                                                                                                                                            
a few there, will have no effect. Thinking, even tinkering “within the box,” is not likely to help. 
To support liberalization, the WTO rules should support identification of the benefits from 
liberalization. 
The conclusions in a paragraph: The binding of tariff rates and adoption of GATT/WTO-
sanctioned safeguards and antidumping mechanisms provided the basis to remove a multitude of 
instruments of protection, and to maintain centralized control over the management of pressures 
for protection in agencies with economy-wide accountabilities.  WTO procedural requirements 
(e.g., to follow published criteria, participation by interested parties) provided a basis for 
changing the culture of decision-making from one based on relationships to one based on 
objective criteria.  However, when Latin American governments included the straightforward 
economic sense of taking into account the negative impact of an import restriction on domestic 
users, protection-seekers used the rules against them – pointed out that WTO rules do not require 
consideration of such elements, that procedures in ‘leading’ users do not include them.  
Likewise, attempts to base price comparisons on an economically sensible measure of long run 
international price brought protectionist criticism for not using the more generous ‘constructed 
cost’ concept applied in ‘leading’ countries and around which WTO discussion swarms.  Finally, 
WTO rules fail to take into account the reality of resources available for policy management in 
developing countries.  Simpler procedures that made economic sense were found not in 
compliance. In a sentence, the administrative content of the rules supported liberalization, the 
economic content did not. 
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X.  TABLES 








Antidumping   37  23  62 
Safeguard   34  25  74 
    WTO  11  10  91 
    Special  10  5  50 
    Andean  13  10  77 
Source: Tabulated from date in Table 5.2 of WPS3615   45
Table 2  Mexico: Antidumping Duty Levels in Different Situations 
Price comparison  Level of duty 
Normal value = International price > 
Export price 
Duty = Dumping margin 
Normal value > International price > 
Export price 
Duty = Difference between export price and 
international price 
Export price = International price < 
Normal value 
No antidumping duty – injury (if observed) is 
from normal international competition 
Source: WPS3684   46
Table 3 Outcomes of Peru’s Antidumping Investigations 1993–June 2004 
 1993–2000  2001–June  2004 
Number of investigations completed  32  25 
Number of restrictive measures  11  18 
Number closed without restrictive measures   21  4 
Restrictive measures as percentage of 
investigations completed  34  82 
Average number of definitive measures per 
year   1.4  4.5 
Source: WPS3658   47
Table 4 Applied Tariff Rates on Industrial Goods for Selected Latin American Countries 
Most-favored nation rates, percentage ad valorem) 
   Simple  Minimum Maximum
Country Year  Average  Rate  Rate 
Argentina 2003  15  0  35 
Brazil 2003  14 0  35 
Chile 2002  7  0  7 
Colombia 2002  13  0  35 
Costa Rica  2002  6  0  15 
Mexico 2003  18  0 35 
Peru 2000  13  12  20 
Source: UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) TRAINS Data base.  
   48
Table 5 Antidumping Initiations as Notified to WTO, 1995–June 2004: Countries included in the study and major users 
















Argentina  27 22 14 8 23 45 26 14 1  7 187 19.7 23.6 8.8
Brazil  5 18 11 18 16 11 17 8 4  6 114 12.0 13.7 7.2
C h i   l e 430205000 0       14 3.1 2.0 0.0
C o l o m b   i a 411623600 0       23 2.4 3.3 0.0
C o s t a   R i   c a 041100000 0       6 0.6 0.9 0.0
Mexico  4 4 6 12 11 7 5 10 14  3 76 8.0 7.0 10.8
P e   r u 2723818 1 25 3       51 5.4 4.4 8.0
Major users, 
for 
c o m p a r i s   o n                   
United  States  14 22 15 36 47 47 76 35 37  21 350 36.8 36.7 37.2
European 
Community  33 25 41 22 65 32 29 20 7  13 287 30.2 35.3 16.0
S o u t h   A f r i   c a 1 6 3 3 2 3 4 1 1 6 2 1648 4       172 18.1 22.3 6.4
India  6 21 13 27 65 41 79 81 46  4 383 40.3 36.0 52.4
Source: WTO  Database    49
 
Table 6 Antidumping Measures as Notified to WTO, 1995–June 2004 

















in place as 
of June 
30, 2004 
Argentina 13  20  11 12 9 15 15 24 19  1 139 14.6 13.6 17.6 76 
Brazil 2  6  2 14 5 9 13 4 2  2 59 6.2 7.3 3.2 54 
Chile 2  0  2 2 0 0 0 0 0  0 6 0.6 0.9 0.0 0 
Colombia 1  1  1 0 6 2 0 0 0  0 11 1.2 1.6 0.0 0 
Costa Rica  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 1  0 1 0.1 0.0 0.4 1 
Mexico   16  4  7 7 7 7 3 4 7  3 65 6.8 7.3 5.6 58 
Peru 2  1  2 0 3 4 1 6 7  4 30 3.2 1.9 6.8 29 
Major users, for 
c o m p a r i s   o n                    
United States  33  11  20 16 24 32 33 24 12  6 211 22.2 24.1 16.8 293 
European 
Community 15  23  23 26 18 41 13 25 3  6 193 20.3 22.7 13.6 165 
South Africa  0  8  18 14 35 13 5 15 1  2 111 11.7 13.3 7.2 84 
India 7  2  8 22 22 57 38 64 53  6 279 29.4 22.3 49.2 216 
Source: WTO Database Table 7 Countervailing Duty Initiations and Measures 1995–June 2004 
















in place as 
of June 30, 
2004 
Initiations                     
Argentina    1 1 1 0 0 0  0  0  1  0 4  0.4 0.4 n.a. 
Brazil    0 0 0 0 0 0  1  0  1  0 2  0.2 0.2 n.a. 
Chile    0 0 0 0 4 0  0  0  0  0 4  0.4 0.5 n.a. 
Costa  Rica  0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  1  0 1  0.1   n.a. 
Mexico    0 0 1 0 0 0  0  0  1  0 2  0.2 0.2 n.a. 
Peru    0 0 1 0 0 1  0  1  0  0 3  0.3 0.4 n.a. 
Measures                      
Argentina   0  2 0 2 0 0  0  0  0  0 4  0.4 0.5 3 
Brazil    5 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0  0 5  0.5 0.0 0 
Chile    0 0 0 0 0 2  0  0  0  0 2  0.2 0.2 0 
Costa  Rica  0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0  1 1  0.1 0.1 0 
Mexico    7 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0  0 7  0.7 0.0 1 
Peru    1 0 0 0 0 0  1  0  1  0 3  0.3 0.2 1 
  50  51
Source: WTO Database Note: n.a. = not applicable. Colombia has initiated no countervailing duty investigation. Comparative 
numbers for measures in place; United States 57, European Communities 18, Canada 10.  
Table 8 Numbers of Safeguard Initiations and Other Safeguard Actions Notified to the 
WTO by Selected Latin American Countries; 1996–October 18, 2004 (blank spaces imply an 
entry of 0, the 0’s wee left out to reduce clutter) 
 







Argentina             
Initiations   1  1  1  1     1  3 
Preliminary  measures        1        
Definitive  measures  applied   1    1  1       2 
Negative decision on definitive 
measures               
Presumed  negative       1          1 
Ongoing           1   
Brazil              
Initiations  1       1  1      1 
Preliminary  measures  1        1      1 
Definitive  measures  applied 1       1  1      1 
Negative decision on definitive 
measures              
P r e s u m e d   n e g a t i v e               
Ongoing              
Chile              
Initiations        1 4 2 3      5 
Preliminary  measures      1  2        3 
Definitive  measures  applied        1 1 1 1      2 
Negative decision on definitive 
measures       2  1  2      2 
Presumed  negative       1        1 
Ongoing              
Colombia             
Initiations       1        1 1 
Preliminary measures                
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Definitive measures applied                
Negative decision on definitive 
measures      1         1 
P r e s u m e d   n e g a t i v e               
Ongoing           1  
Costa Rica              
Initiations       1        1 
Preliminary  measures       1        1 
Definitive  measures  applied              
Negative decision on definitive 
m e a s u r e s               
Presumed  negative       1        1 
Ongoing              
Mexico              
Initiations         1       
Preliminary  measures              
Definitive  measures  applied              
Negative decision on definitive 
m e a s u r e s               
Presumed  negative         1       
Ongoing              
Peru              
Initiations           1   
Preliminary  measures              
Definitive  measures  applied              
Negative decision on definitive 
measures              
P r e s u m e d   n e g a t i v e               
Ongoing           1   
Seven Countries              
Initiations  1 1 1 2 6 4 5    3  11 
Preliminary  measures  1      1 3 1 1      5 
Definitive  measures  applied  1 1    1 2 3 2      5 
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Negative decision on definitive 
measures        1 2 1 2      3 
Presumed  negative     1  2  1     3 
Ongoing           3   
Source: Tabulated from information in WTO “Report [one per year 2000-4]of the Committee on 
Safeguards to the Council for Trade in Goods” for 2000 2004  
Note: The actions are tabulated by the year in which each investigation was initiated, for example, if an 
Argentine investigation initiated in 1997 led to a definitive measure put in place in 1998, then that 
definitive measure is included in the tabulation for 1997, not for 1998. 
The countries in the table  all notified zero actions in 1995, the first year the WTO notification 
requirement was in force. 
The WTO reports no notification of measure taken or of termination for several investigations that have 
past the WTO deadline for a final determination. We have labeled these “outcomes” as “presumed 
negative.” 
 
 